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ANALYSIS
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Abstract
A forester and a conservation organization bargain over the commercial exploitation or preservation of a forested
tract of land with unique ecological characteristics. The forester can improve its bargaining position by preparing a
portion of the land for future timber production prior to negotiations between the two. However, doing so decreases
the preservation value of the forest, as well as the compensation the conservation group is willing to pay to preserve
the forest. The analysis suggests that the forester will begin preparing the land for timber production prior to
negotiations only when the value of the land in timber production is significantly lower than the preservation values
of the conservation group. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Preservation; Bargaining; Threat positions
JEL classification: D62; Q20

1. Introduction
De-centralized bargaining to control environmental externalities is widespread. Negotiated
agreements between non-profit organizations and
landowners to preserve ecologically sensitive areas, debt-for-nature swaps, and international envi* Tel.: + 413-545-6328; fax: + 413-545-5853.
E-mail address: stranlund@resecon.umass.edu (J.K. Stranlund)
PII: S 0 9 2 1 - 8 0 0 9 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 6 5 - 8

ronmental agreements to control transboundary
pollutants are only a few examples. Accordingly,
there exists a very large literature that examines
negotiated resolutions of environmental conflicts.
A portion of this literature has examined the
incentives parties to negotiations over the use of
an environmental asset have to establish better
bargaining positions by committing themselves to
threat positions; that is, to actions to be taken in
case negotiations break down. For example,
Buchholz and Konrad (1994) identify an incentive

nations have to commit themselves to inferior
pollution-control technologies prior to an agreement to control a transboundary pollutant. This
investment commits a nation to a higher level of
emissions in case of bargaining impasse, and this
threat can give a nation a stronger bargaining
position and ultimately more favorable terms
from a successfully negotiated agreement.
Copeland (1990) identifies a similar incentive in
the context of international negotiations to limit
over-exploitation of an open-ocean fishery.
Of course, a threat of any sort requires an
initial irreversible action (investment) that makes
it rational for the threat-maker to follow through
on the threat if the need arises (Schelling, 1960,
chapter 2). Simply put, any threat must be credible. Adopting the theory of rational threats that
follows from the Nash bargaining solution,
Richer and Stranlund (1997) have focused on the
optimality and credibility of threats in the classic
context of bargaining between a polluting firm
and the victim of its pollution. Stranlund (1999)
has extended this work to cases of bilateral externalities to focus on equilibrium threat strategies.
Regardless of the approach or context, all of the
existing literature on threat making prior to bargaining to control environmental externalities suggests that these investments can have significant
adverse impacts on the health and value of environmental assets, as well as the efficiency of bargaining over the use of these assets.
This paper examines the role of threat making
in the context of bargaining over the commercial
exploitation and/or preservation of a unique
ecosystem. To be concrete, we shall examine a
situation in which a forester has the unrestricted
right to place all or a portion of a tract of land
into timber production. On the other hand, a
conservation organization is interested in preserving the existing forest because it has unique ecological characteristics in its natural state.
Bargaining between the forester and the conservation group is over how much of the forest will be
converted to timber production and how much
will be preserved in its existing state.
As in the contexts addressed in the earlier
works, the forester may be able to improve its
bargaining position by committing itself to con-

verting a certain portion of the forest to timber
production in case the two parties fail to negotiate
a mutually agreeable harvest/preservation plan.
Indeed, the forester has a natural commitment
mechanism by which to make its harvest threat
credible. Preparing the land for timber production
by building logging roads into the forest prior to
negotiations is a sunk, irreversible investment that
gives credibility to a threat to harvest a certain
portion of the forest in case of bargaining impasse. What distinguishes this exercise from earlier works is that building roads into the forest
also diminishes its preservation value; hence, the
compensation the conservation group would willingly offer to preserve the forest is less. In deciding upon an anticipatory investment to establish a
harvest threat, the forester must then weigh the
gain from improving its bargaining position
against lower compensation from a negotiated
agreement and the direct cost of establishing the
threat.
The primary issue that this paper addresses has
not been dealt with before: Under what circumstances will the owner of a natural asset try to
establish a better bargaining position by preparing
the asset for future commercial exploitation prior
to negotiations to preserve the asset? The analysis
of this paper suggests, somewhat paradoxically,
that a property owner will make a preparatory
investment only when the commercial value of the
asset is significantly lower than the value of the
asset in its natural state.
The answer to the question posed by this paper
is likely to be an important consideration in a
number of actual bargaining situations. For example, in the United States there are many nonprofit organizations whose sole purpose is to
protect ecologically significant areas from development. Excluding large national conservation organizations like the Nature Conservancy, there
are more than 1000 of these so-called land trusts,
and these organizations protect more than five
million acres of land nationwide. Through negotiations with landowners, these land trusts protect
sensitive areas by purchasing them outright, or by
purchasing conservation easements or mineral
and grazing rights (Land Trust Alliance, 1995;
Wiebe, 1994). A similar application involves debt-

for-nature swaps in which a conservation organization agrees to retire a part of the debt of a
national government in exchange for that government’s commitment to preserve a unique ecosystem under its control. (Deacon and Murphy
(1997) analyze the structure of actual debt-for-nature swaps, and Chambers et al. (1996) model
these trades in non-cooperative and cooperative
settings). In these and similar cases, it behooves a
conservation organization to know when a property owner is likely to make an anticipatory investment to improve its bargaining position
because this investment affects the terms of any
agreement between the two, as well as the health
of the ecosystem under consideration.

2. Harvest and preservation values
The bargaining game that we examine is between a forester and a conservation organization
over the commercial exploitation or preservation
of a forest consisting of A acres. The forester has
the unrestricted right to harvest the forest, but the
conservation group is willing to compensate the
forester to preserve all or a portion of the forest.
The timber in the forest is of uniform density
and quality. If a portion of the land is harvested,
the forester will keep it in timber production for
the foreseeable future with a sequence of re-plantings and harvests. Assume that the long run,
per-acre value of the forest in timber production
is pf. To prepare a portion of the forest for timber
production, the forester must build a logging road
into the forest. Each mile of road prepares a acres
for timber production. Let r denote the length of
a logging road and h denote acres in timber
production. Then, given a road of length r, the
number of acres that can be harvested is h 5 ar.
The cost of road building is c(r) with c%(r)\ 0,
c¦(r) \0, and c(0)=c%(0) =0. Later in the analysis we shall assume that the cost function takes a
quadratic form; however, this additional structure
is not needed for most of the analysis. Assume
that a logging road has no valuable alternative
opportunities. Therefore, building one is an irreversible investment in timber production capacity,
and the costs of road building are sunk.

In the absence of a cooperative agreement to
preserve a portion of the forest, the forester’s
long-run profit is pfh− c(r)=pfar− c(r). To maximize the value of the forest in timber production,
the forester chooses a road length that maximizes
pfar−c(r) subject to r[0, A/a], where A/a is the
length of the logging road needed to harvest the
entire tract. The associated Kuhn–Tucker condition is pfa− c%(r)] 0, and if \0, r= A/a. Let the
long-run, profit-maximizing number of acres in
timber production be h p = ar p. Since c%(0)= 0, the
forester would choose to harvest at least some of
the forest in the absence of an agreement to
preserve part of the forest; that is, h p = ar p \ 0.
Let us suppose for simplicity that r p B A/a; that
is, simple profit-maximization would leave part of
the tract undisturbed. Then, we have
pfa− c%(r p)

0

(1)

The conservation group values the preservation
of the forest because it contains some unique
ecological characteristics that are lost when the
forest is harvested. In fact, the formal analysis
assumes that the conservation group considers the
tract to be truly unique in the sense that it does
not feel that it has other preservation opportunities that are reasonably close substitutes. This
assumption has two important effects on the
forester’s willingness to invest in improving its
bargaining position prior to negotiations with the
conservation group. First, because the group feels
that it does not have comparable preservation
opportunities, it will not be able to credibly walk
away from negotiations with the forester to pursue another preservation opportunity. (Section 5
includes a discussion of how the presence of an
outside option for the conservation group may
limit the forester’s ability to invest in improving
its bargaining position). Second, the lack of substitute preservation opportunities likely implies
that the conservation group places a relatively
high value on preserving the forest.1 We shall see
1

Empirical evidence of higher valuations for environmental
goods without close substitutes can be found in Whitehead
and Blomquist (1991), Hoehn and Loomis (1993), Cummings
et al. (1994), Boxall et al. (1996). An anonymous reviewer
deserves credit for bringing this literature to my attention.

that high preservation values, relative to the commercial value of the forest, is the critical determinant of whether the forester will have sufficient
incentive to make an anticipatory investment to
improve its bargaining position.
Let us assume that the group’s long-run, per-acre
valuation of preserving a portion of the forest
depends on whether this portion is completely
undisturbed or it has been prepared for timber
production, and that the group values undisturbed
acreage more highly than preserved land that has
been prepared for harvest. Assume that the group
places a value of p uc per acre of completely undisturbed forest; p dc Bp uc per acre of land that has been
prepared for timber production but is preserved
instead, and it does not value land in timber
production at all. Suppose for a moment that there
is a road of length r̄ BA/a into the forest and
h0 Bar̄ acres are in timber production. Then, the
value the group places on the entire tract is p uc (A −
ar̄) + p dc (ar̄ − h0 ), where A −ar̄ is the amount of
land left undisturbed and ar̄ −h0 is the amount of
land that is prepared for timber production but is
preserved instead.

2.1. Efficient preser6ation and har6est
The efficient harvest plan for the forest is the
number of acres h* in timber production that
maximizes the joint payoffs of the forester and the
conservation group. Since it cannot be efficient to
extend a road into land that will not be harvested,
the efficient harvest plan is completely determined
by the efficient length of a logging road. The
efficient road length maximizes p uc (A − ar) +
pfar− c(r) subject to r [0,A/a]. Again, A/a is the
length of the road needed to harvest the entire
tract. The Kuhn–Tucker condition is
a(pf − p uc )− c%(r)

!

50, if B 0, r* = 0
] 0, if \0, r* = A/a

r* =0, if p f −p uc 5 0
r* \0, if p f −p uc \ 0.

2.2. Nash bargaining
Assume throughout that any agreement between
the forester and the conservation group is characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. Denote
the bargaining payoffs to the forester and the
conservation group as 6f and 6c, respectively. The
Nash bargaining solution is then the pair of payoffs
(6f, 6c) that maximize the product [6f − zf][6c − zc]
subject to V] 6f + 6c, where V is the maximal value
of an agreement and (zf, zc) is the payoff allocation
in the event that negotiations between the two
players are unsuccessful. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to the bargaining
problem are [6f − zf]= [6c − zc] and V= 6f + 6c, the
explicit solution to which are the bargaining payoffs
6f = (1/2)[V+ zf − zc]
6c = (1/2)[V+ zc − zf].

(2)

and
(3)

The disagreement payoffs in the Nash bargaining solution, (zf, zc), are often called threat positions because they specify the outcome of
unsuccessful bargaining. The theory of rational
threats recognizes that parties to an agreement
have an incentive to manipulate these payoffs
before the completion of an agreement to shift the
terms of an agreement to their advantage.3 To
2

The Kuhn–Tucker condition and the assumptions
about the cost of road-building imply that the
efficient road length is such that

!

Eq. (2) reveals that the efficient use of the forest
is to leave it undisturbed if and only if the per-acre
value of undisturbed forest is not less than the
per-acre value of the land in timber production.
Otherwise, it is efficient that some of the forest be
used for timber production. Under the assumption
that r p B A/a, r*Br p, and therefore h*B h p; that
is, efficiency requires that less of the tract be placed
in timber production than the forester would
choose in the absence of a bargaining opportunity.2

The efficient road length r* is determined from the KuhnTucker condition pfa − p uc a − c%(r)5 0, and if B0, r* =0. The
profit-maximizing road length r p is determined by pfa − c%(r)=
0. The presence of p uc a as an additional cost of harvest in the
determination of the efficient road length implies r* Br p.
3
Useful expositions of the theory of rational threats can be
found in many game theory texts (e.g. Harsanyi, 1977; Myerson,
1991). Readers who seek an accessible introduction to the Nash
bargaining solution might begin with Binmore et al. (1986).

establish a better bargaining position in this
way, a player must be able to commit itself to an
action (i.e. threat) before the completion of an
agreement that will be taken in case of bargaining
impasse.
In our context, the conservation group has no
mechanism by which it can attempt to establish a
better bargaining position by manipulating the
disagreement payoffs, and it does not have a
credible walk-away threat because it considers
the tract to be truly unique. However, the
forester may be able to improve its bargaining
position by building a road into the forest
before bargaining begins, because the existence
of a road can establish a credible threat to harvest
a certain number of acres should the two
parties fail to reach an agreement. Whether the
forester is actually motivated to undertake this
anticipatory investment depends on its bargaining
payoff when it builds a logging road prior to
bargaining and its payoff when it refrains from
doing so. Section 3 is devoted to deriving the
forester’s optimal anticipatory investment and its
resulting bargaining payoff. We conclude this section by deriving the forester’s bargaining payoff
when it refrains from making this anticipatory
investment.

2.3. Bargaining without an anticipatory
in6estment
Without a road in the forest when bargaining
begins, in case the two parties fail to reach agreement, the forester will build a road of profit-maximizing length r p and produce timber on h p =ar p
acres after negotiations fail. In this case the disagreement payoffs are
z 0f (r p)= pfar p −c(r p)
z 0c (r p)= p uc (A− ar p).

and

The disagreement payoffs Eq. (4) contain a key
determinant of whether the forester will try to
improve its bargaining position with an initial
investment in a logging road. It is important to
note that the forester has a credible harvest threat
without preparing part of the forest for harvest –
in case of bargaining impasse, it is clear that the
forester will place h p = ar p acres into timber production. The purpose of building a logging road
prior to negotiations is to improve on this bargaining position. Now, h p = ar p is increasing in
the per-acre value of the forest in timber production, pf.4Thus, when the timber value of the forest
is low, the forester has a relatively weak bargaining position because, if the two parties fail to
reach a cooperative agreement, the forester will
harvest only a small portion of the forest and
leave the rest in its natural state. Conversely,
when the timber value of the forest is high, the
forester has a stronger bargaining position. One
might expect that the forester will be more likely
to try and improve on its bargaining position with
an anticipatory investment when its bargaining
position is weak in the absence of such an investment. In Section 4 we shall see that this intuition
is quite correct.
The maximal value of an agreement when the
forester does not build a logging road prior to
bargaining is the value of the efficient preservation/harvest plan,
V 0 = (A− ar*)+ pfar*− c(r*),

(5)

where r* is the efficient road length given by Eq.
(2). Using Eqs. (3)–(5), the forester’s bargaining
payoff when it does not build a logging road prior
to bargaining is
6 0f (r p)= (1/2)[V 0 + pfar p − c(r p)− p uc (A−ar p)],
(6)

(4)

(Throughout, the superscript ‘0’ denote values
when the forester does not build a road prior
to bargaining). In case negotiations fail, the
forester gets the value of the profit-maximizing
timber production and the conservation group
gets the preservation value of the portion of the
forest that the forester finds unprofitable to harvest.

and the conservation group’s payoff is
6 0c = (1/2)[V 0 + p uc (A−ar p)− pfar p + c(r p)].

(7)

To show that h p =ar p is increasing in pf, first recall from
Eq. (1) that r p is the solution to the first-order condition
pfa − c%(r)= 0. From the first-order condition we can obtain
the comparative static (r p/(pf =a/c¦(r)\ 0, the sign of which
follows because c¦(r) \0.
4

3. An anticipatory investment to establish a
stronger bargaining position
To analyze the forester’s motivation to prepare
a portion of the forest for harvest before negotiating with the conservation group, we consider a
two-stage game. In the first stage the forester may
prepare a portion of the forest for future timber
production by building a logging road of length r t
into the forest. (The superscript t denotes values
when the forester makes an anticipatory investment to improve its bargaining position). In the
second stage, the forester and the conservation
group successfully negotiate an agreement about a
harvest/preservation plan for the forest. The
agreement and the resulting payoffs are determined by the Nash bargaining solution. Of
course, the negotiated outcome will depend on the
forester’s first-stage choice.
Complete information is assumed so that the
forester knows the conservation group’s values for
disturbed and undisturbed land, and the conservation group knows the value of timber production
and the costs of road building. We shall also
assume perfect information so that the conservation group observes the forester’s anticipatory
investment before the two enter into negotiations.
Lastly, all information is common knowledge.
Since building a logging road is an irreversible
investment in timber production capacity, the
forester’s first-stage investment may credibly commit it to put h t acres into timber production in
case the two fail to reach an agreement. Credibility of the forester’s harvest threat h t requires that,
given a road of length r t and bargaining impasse
between the two parties, the forester does not
extend the road to put additional land into timber
production; that is, we require that the harvest
threat be such that h t 5ar t. Credibility also requires that the forester not leave prepared land
out of timber production in case of bargaining
impasse. In fact, the forester will always harvest
the prepared portion of the tract in case of bargaining impasse because the marginal value of
prepared land in timber production, pfa, is always
positive. Therefore, a harvest threat is credible if
and only if it is exactly equal to the acreage the
forester prepares for timber production before
negotiations begin; that is, h t =ar t.

The existence of a road prior to bargaining
affects all of the components of the Nash bargaining solution. Therefore, let the disagreement payoffs be (zf, zc)= [z tf(r t), z tc(r t)], and let the maximal
value of the agreement be V= V(r t). From Eq.
(3), the bargaining payoffs are:
6 tf(r t)= (1/2)[V t(r t)+ z tf(r t)− z tc(r t)];
6 tc(r t)= (1/2)[V t(r t)+ z tc(r t)− z tf(r t)]

(8)

Since h t = ar t acres will be converted to timber
production in case of bargaining impasse, the
disagreement payoff to the forester is the value of
timber production on the prepared portion of the
tract, and the disagreement payoff to the conservation group is the preservation value of the
forest that is left. Thus,
z tf(r t)= pfar t

and

z tc(r t)= p uc (A−ar t).

(9)

Note that since the cost of building the road c(r t)
is expended before bargaining begins, it is not
part of the forester’s disagreement payoff.
Now, given an existing road of length r t, the
forester and the conservation group will negotiate
the number of acres to be placed in timber production, h a 5 ar t, to maximize their joint payoffs.5
The value to the conservation group of h a is
p uc (A−ar t)+ p dc (ar t − h a), where (A− ar t) is the
number of undisturbed acres and (ar t − h a) is the
amount of land that has been prepared for harvest but that will be preserved instead. The value
to the forester of h a is pfh a. The harvest plan the
two negotiate maximizes p uc (A−ar t)+ p dc (ar t −
h a)+ pfh a subject to h a [0, ar t]. Ignoring the case
of pf − p dc = 0, the appropriate Kuhn–Tucker
condition implies
5
Credibility of a harvest threat implies that an agreement
will not specify h a \ar t. To see this, recall from Eq. (1) that
pfa − c%(r p) 0. If r t Br p, then pfa − c%(r t) \0; that is, the
value of extending the road beyond r t is strictly positive. This
implies that if r t Br p, the forester will extend the road to r p in
case of impasse; hence, r t Br p, does not signal a credible
threat. To see why an agreement will not specify h a \ar t, note
that r t ]r p implies pfa 5 c%(r t); hence, an extension of the
logging road beyond r t cannot be justified on the grounds of
the value of additional harvest. Furthermore, extending the
road will only decrease the preservation value of the tract.

h a(r t)=

!

ar t if p f − p dc \0
0 if p f − p dc B0.

(10)

The welfare-maximizing harvest plan, given
that a portion of the forest has already been
prepared for harvest, depends on the value of the
land in timber production relative to the value of
preserving land that has been prepared for harvest. If the per-acre value of the land in timber
production is greater, the parties will agree to
harvest the prepared portion of the forest. If the
preservation value of prepared land is greater, the
prepared portion will be preserved. Note two
sources of inefficiency associated with this latter
outcome: an ultimately unproductive logging road
is built and the existence of the road diminishes
the preservation value of the forest.
Now, the maximal value of the harvest agreement is V t(r t)= p uc (A − ar t) + p dc (ar t −h a(r t)) +
pfh a(r t). Using Eq. (10),
V t(r t)=

!

p uc (A− ar t) + pfar t if pf −p dc \0
p uc (A− ar t) +p dc ar t if pf −p dc B0.

(11)

We are now ready to characterize the optimal
anticipatory investment. Using the forester’s bargaining payoff from Eq. (8), its disagreement payoffs from Eq. (9), and the maximal value of the
agreement Eq. (11), the forester’s bargaining payoff when it builds a logging road prior to negotiations is
6 tf(r t) =

!

p far t if pf − p dc \0
1
t
d
d
2(p c +pf)ar if pf −p c B0.

(12)

The optimal choice of r t maximizes
6 tf(r t) − c(r t) s.t. r t [0,A/a].

(13)

4. When will the forester invest in improving its
bargaining position?
We are now ready to characterize all of the
possible outcomes of the game. There are three
cases to consider. In the first, the per-acre timber
value exceeds the conservation group’s per-acre
valuation of both undisturbed and prepared land;
that is, pf \p uc \ p dc . In the second case, the timber
value exceeds the conservation group’s valuation
of prepared land, but not its valuation of undis-

turbed land; that is p uc ] pf \ p dc . Finally in the
third case, the timber value is less than the conservation group’s valuation of both undisturbed and
prepared land; that is, pf B p dc B p uc . The outcomes
of the game in each of these situations are specified in a series of lemmas. All lemmas and
corollaries are proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Suppose that pf \ p uc \ p dc . Then, the
forester does not prepare a portion of the forest
for future timber production prior to the bargaining agreement. The agreement that the two parties
negotiate specifies that h*=ar*\ 0 acres of the
forest be used for timber production and the rest
preserved in its original state.
Lemma 2. Suppose instead that p uc ] pf \ p dc . As in
Lemma 1, the forester does not prepare a portion
of the forest for future timber production prior to
the bargaining agreement. However, the agreement between the two parties specifies that the
entire tract be preserved.
The outcomes outlined in the two lemmas are
similar in that the forester does not try to improve
its bargaining position by preparing a part of the
forest for harvest. However, in the situation considered in Lemma 1 the agreement the two parties
negotiate allocates a portion of the tract to timber
production, while in the case that Lemma 2 considers the parties agree to preserve the entire
forest.
In the situations addressed by Lemmas 1 and 2,
the forester refrains from an anticipatory investment. The reason for this is quite simple. The
proofs of the lemmas indicate that if the forester
prepared a part of the forest for harvest, it would
prepare exactly that acreage that it would convert
to timber production in the absence of any agreement. But, doing so implies that the joint welfaremaximizing use of the forest is to produce timber
on the prepared portion and preserve the rest.
Since this is exactly what would occur in the
absence of bargaining, there is no longer a gain
from negotiating a cooperative agreement. Thus,
the forester decides to refrain from its anticipatory investment and the parties are able to negotiate an agreement that specifies the efficient use of
the forest.

The remaining case — the case in which the
timber value is below the conservation group’s
valuations of both undisturbed and prepared land
— is difficult to analyze without additional structure on the road-building cost function. Therefore, from here on we shall assume that this
function takes on a quadratic form.
Lemma 3. Suppose that pf Bp dc Bp uc , and that the
cost of road building is c(r) = (h/2)(r)2, where h is
a positive constant. Then there exists a timber
value p̄f that is strictly between zero and p dc such
that if the actual timber value falls below p̄f, the
forester will build a road into the forest prior to
bargaining. If the actual timber value is above p̄f,
the forester will refrain from building a road into
the forest prior to bargaining. In both cases, the
agreement that the parties come to specifies that
no portion of the forest be used for timber
production.
It is interesting that the forester finds it individually rational to attempt to strengthen its bargaining position only when the value of timber
production is significantly below the preservation
values of the forest. And remember that the
preservation values of the forest are likely to be
high because the conservation group considers the
tract unique. Unfortunately, therefore, the
forester is more likely to make a harmful threatmotivated investment when preservation is most
valuable.
To see the intuition that drives Lemma 3, recall
that an anticipatory investment decreases the
preservation value of the forest, and is therefore
costly for the forester because it decreases the
amount of compensation the conservation group
pays for the preservation of the forest. The
forester must weigh this cost and the cost of
building the road to establish its threat against the
value of establishing a stronger threat position.
When the per-acre timber value of the forest is
relatively low, without an anticipatory investment
in harvest capacity the forester’s threat position is
rather weak because, in case of bargaining impasse, the forester will harvest only a small portion of the forest and leave the rest in its natural
state. When the forester has a weak bargaining

position, it has a strong motivation to improve its
bargaining position with an anticipatory investment despite the costs associated with devaluing
the agreement the two parties come to and building the road to establish its threat. On the other
hand, when the timber value of the forest is
relatively high the forester has a strong credible
threat to harvest a large portion of the forest in
case of bargaining impasse. Thus, its incentive to
improve its bargaining position with an anticipatory investment is low when the timber value of
the forest is high.
To gain additional insight into how the forest
values work together to determine whether the
forester will invest in improving its bargaining
position, let us examine how the cut-off timber
value depends on the values of the conservation
group.
Corollary 1. The cut-off timber value, p̄f, is decreasing in p uc and increasing in p dc .
Under the conditions of Lemma 3, the forester
prepares a portion of the forest for timber production to improve its bargaining position, but
the parties agree that this portion of the forest
will never be harvested. Preparation of a portion
of the forest for harvest diminishes the per acre
preservation value of the prepared portion by
p uc − p dc . This implies that the loss associated with
an anticipatory investment is increasing in the
value of undisturbed land (p uc ) and decreasing in
the value of preserved land that has been prepared for harvest (p dc ). Thus, (p̄f/(p dc B 0 reveals
that the forester is less likely to invest in improving its bargaining position — in the sense that the
range of pf for which it is individually rational for
the forester to do so is smaller — when the lost
preservation value associated with this investment
is high. Similarly, (p̄f/(p dc \ 0 reveals that the
forester is more likely to invest in improving its
bargaining position when the foregone preservation value of doing so is low.
Further insight is obtained by considering the
forester’s decision to make an anticipatory investment at the endpoints of the range of the conservation group’s valuation of preserved land that
has been prepared for harvest.

Fig. 1. The effects of timber and preservation values on bargaining outcomes.

Corollary 2. Suppose that p dc =0 so that the conservation group does not value land that has been
prepared for timber production. Then, the
forester will never prepare a part of the land for
timber production before negotiations.
Corollary 3. Suppose that p dc =p uc so that the
conservation group values land that has been
prepared for harvest the same as completely
undisturbed land. Then, as in Lemma 3, the cutoff timber value, p̄f, is still strictly between zero
and p dc .
Corollary 2 reveals that the forester will never
invest in improving its bargaining position when
doing so yields the prepared portion of the forest
worthless from the conservation group’s point of
view. Corollaries 1 and 2 together suggest that a
critical determinant of the forester’s decision to
undertake an anticipatory investment is the fact
that such an investment diminishes the preservation value of the forest. However, Corollary 3
reveals that even when the forester’s investment
has no effect on the preservation value of the
forest, the forester will refrain from investing in
improving its bargaining position if the timber
value of the forest is high enough.

5. Summary and discussion
Fig. 1 summarizes our results about how the
timber and preservation values determine whether
or not the forester makes an anticipatory investment to improve its bargaining position, as well as
the efficient and negotiated levels of timber production. When the per-acre timber value exceeds
the conservation group’s valuation of completely

undisturbed forest, it is efficient to use a portion
of the forest for timber production and preserve
the rest. Bargaining between the two parties results in an agreement that specifies this outcome.
When the timber value falls below the conservation group’s valuation of undisturbed forest, it is
efficient to leave the entire forest in its natural
state, and again, bargaining between the two
parties leads to this outcome. However, when the
timber value is significantly below the conservation group’s values, the forester’s weak bargaining
position motivates it to improve its bargaining
position by preparing a part of the forest for
harvest.
When the forester makes a preparatory investment to improve its bargaining position, two
kinds of inefficiency result. First, although the
forester expends resources to prepare a part of the
forest for harvest, no harvesting ever takes place;
hence, from a social welfare point of view, the
forester’s initial investment is wasted. Second, the
forester’s initial investment reduces the preservation value of the tract even though it is efficient to
leave the entire forest undisturbed.
If the two parties fail to reach an agreement —
an aspect of real negotiations that is not dealt
with by most bargaining games, including Nash
bargaining — a third type of inefficiency may
result from the forester’s attempt to improve its
bargaining position. Recall that the forester’s investment establishes a credible threat to harvest a
part of the forest in case of bargaining impasse.
Then, if impasse occurs, the forester will produce
timber on the prepared portion of the tract in
spite of the fact that when the forester is actually
motivated to make an anticipatory investment, it
is efficient to leave the entire forest in its original
state. In fact, when the forester invests in improv-

ing its bargaining position, it will prepare a larger
portion of the forest for timber production than it
would in the complete absence of a bargaining
opportunity.6 Thus, it is possible that a failed
bargaining opportunity can result in even less
efficient exploitation of the forest than in a completely non-cooperative setting.
The forester’s attempt to improve its bargaining
position may even be the reason that negotiations
break down. In order to focus the analysis clearly
on the motivations of the forester, we have not
given the conservation group an opportunity to
establish a threat position for itself. In reality,
however, a conservation group may have a strong
motivation to walk away from negotiations with a
landowner, particularly if it has opportunities to
negotiate agreements to preserve other comparable properties. The model of this paper implies
that the payoff to the conservation group of a
successfully negotiated agreement is reduced by
the forester’s attempt to improve its bargaining
position. Thus, the forester’s harvest threat could
induce the conservation group to simply walk
away and focus its resources elsewhere. If a conservation group has this walk-away power, a
landowner will take this into account and, therefore, its incentive to improve its bargaining position with an anticipatory investment may be
limited.
Of course, an effective walk-away threat must
be credible, and credibility of such a threat in a
particular bargaining situation likely depends on
the supply of other preservation opportunities and
the extent to which the conservation group feels
that at least some of these other opportunities
represent relatively close substitutes. Without
comparable preservation opportunities, a threat
6
This conclusion follows from a comparison of r p and the
choice of r t when pf Bp dc . Using Eqs. (12) and (13), the
optimal choice of r t in this case maximizes (1/2)(p dc + pf)ar t −
c(r t), subject to r t  [0, A/a]. The associated Kuhn–Tucker
condition is (1/2)(p dc +pf)a− c%(r t)] 0, and if \ 0, r t = A/a
(r t = 0 is not a possible solution). Recall from Eq. (1) that r p
is the solution to pfa-c%(r)= 0. Since pf B p dc , (1/2)(p dc + pf)a\
pfa, which indicates that the marginal benefit of building the
road to signal a harvest threat (r t) is greater than the marginal
benefit of building the simple profit maximizing road (r p). This
inequality implies r t \ r p.

to walk away in response to an attempt by a
property owner to improve its bargaining position
will not be credible. However, the results of this
paper suggest that a conservation group may
have a strategic incentive to develop credible
walk-away threats to limit its vulnerability to
harmful anticipatory threats. Perhaps by widening
its geographic scope and becoming reasonably
well informed about the ecological characteristics
of the properties within this area, a conservation
group may build an inventory of preservation
opportunities that gives it credible walk-away
power.7
However, it bears emphasizing that when a
conservation group is interested in preserving
a unique ecosystem that has no close substitutes, a
threat to walk away and devote its efforts
to preserving other properties is severely limited.
And, of course, many conservation groups
are likely to be much more interested in preserving properties with truly unique ecological characteristics. Furthermore, the preservation of these properties will be highly valued,
which the analysis of this paper suggests may
make harmful anticipatory threats more likely.
Unfortunately, it appears that conservation
groups may be most vulnerable to harmful anticipatory investments when preservation is most
valuable.

6. Conclusion
In a straightforward and stylized model of bargaining between the owner of a environmental
asset and a conservation group that is interested
in preserving the asset in its natural state, we have
examined the asset owner’s motivation to improve
its bargaining position by making an preparatory
investment in the commercial exploitation of the
asset. The primary result of the analysis suggests
7
Lobbying for political action, or building public support
for the preservation of a particular property, may also be
useful strategies for improving a group’s bargaining power.
Extending the model of this paper to examine the consequences of strategies like these may be a fruitful exercise for
future research.

that the asset owner will make such an investment
only when the commercial value of the asset is
significantly lower than its preservation values.
Although seemingly paradoxical, the result is
quite intuitive. When the commercial value of an
asset is low, its owner has a very weak bargaining
position in negotiations with a conservation
group, and hence, the asset owner has a strong
motivation to improve its bargaining position by
preparing the asset for commercial exploitation.
Unfortunately, when this occurs, the initial commercial investment is completely wasted, and a
part of the value associated with preserving the
asset is destroyed.
Perhaps the primary message of this paper is
best viewed as a cautionary note for entities that
are devoted to protecting environmental assets
from commercial development, and that must
pursue their objectives through decentralized negotiations with property owners. The anticipation
of such bargaining may induce a property owner
to take actions that reduce the preservation
value of the asset that is the focus of negotiations.
This is most likely to occur when the commercial
value of the asset is low relative to the value of
preserving the asset in its natural state; when the
lost preservation value associated with a preparatory investment is also low, and when the asset
has truly unique (and consequently, highly valued) ecological characteristics so that its preservation has no close substitutes. When the
commercial value of an asset is high enough, its
owner already has a strong bargaining position
and may not feel compelled to try and improve
this position. Furthermore, since the property
owner’s compensation will be reduced if its
anticipatory investment diminishes the preservation value of the asset, in some situations the
property owner will find that investing in a
stronger bargaining position actually reduces
the compensation a conservation group would
offer for preserving the asset. Lastly, when
the preservation of a particular asset is viewed
as a close substitute for the preservation of another, a conservation group is likely to have a
credible walk-away threat that limits the ability of
a property owner to improve its bargaining
position.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2. First, let us consider
whether the forester will build a road prior to
bargaining. By assumption of both lemmas, pf \
p dc . Then, Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) imply that the
forester chooses to build a road of the length that
maximizes pfar− c(r) subject to r[0, A/a]. The
solution is the simple profit-maximizing road, r p
(recall Eq. (1)). Furthermore, the harvest agreement Eq. (10) allows the forester to harvest the
prepared portion of the tract. But then, there is
no point to bargaining because the forester and
the conservation group end up receiving the values they would have received in the absence of a
bargaining opportunity. Since, the externality associated with timber production implies that both
parties would be better off with a cooperative
agreement than without one, the forester decides
to refrain from preparing a portion of the forest
for timber production prior to negotiations.
Under the condition of Lemma 1 that p dc B pf,
from Eq. (2) and Eq. (5), a bargaining agreement
between the two parties will specify that a road of
length r* \0 will be built into the forest and
h*= ar* acres will be put into timber production.
Under the condition of Lemma 2 that p uc ] pf, the
parties will agree to leave the entire forest
undisturbed
Note: more direct (and longer) proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 would compare the forester’s payoffs
when it does and does not build a logging road
prior to bargaining. These proofs are available
from the author upon request.

Proof of Lemma 3. Let us suppose at first that the
forester refrains from building a road prior to
bargaining. Then, from Eq. (2), pf Bp uc implies
that the parties will agree to leave the entire forest
undisturbed. From Eq. (5), the total value of an
agreement in this case is V 0(r*) = p uc A. Using this
and Eq. (6), the forester’s payoff is
6 0f (r p)= (1/2)[(pf +p uc )ar p −c(r p)].

(A1)

If the forester builds a road prior to bargaining,
since pf B p dc , Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) imply that the
forester will choose the road length r t to maximize
(1/2)[p dc +pf]ar t −c(r t) subject to r t  [0, A/a].
Thus, r t is determined by the Kuhn – Tucker
condition
(1/2)[p dc +pf]ar t −c%(r t) ]0, if \ 0, r t =A/a.
(A2)
t

The road has positive length because at r =0,
(1/2)[p dc +pf]ar −c%(0) = (1/2)[p dc +pf]ar \0. Although the forester builds a road of r t length
prior to bargaining, the harvest agreement that
the parties come to, which is given by Eq. (10),
does not allow it to harvest any timber. Thus,
whether the forester builds a road prior to bargaining or not, no part of the forest will be used
for timber production once an agreement is
completed.
From Eq. (12), the forester’s bargaining payoff
when it builds a road prior to bargaining is (1/
2)[p dc +pf]ar t. Taking into account the cost of
building the road, the forester’s net payoff is
6 tf(r t) − c(r t)=(1/2)[p dc +pf]ar t −c(r t).

(A3)

Subtract Eq. (A1) from Eq. (A3) to obtain
6 tf(r t) − c(r t)−6 0f (r p)
=

1
(pf + p dc )ar t (pf + p uc )ar p
−
− c(r t) + c(r p)
2
2
2
(A4)

The forester will build a road into the forest prior
to bargaining if and only if Eq. (A4) is positive,
and will refrain from doing so if it is negative.
Now, assuming interior values for the road
lengths specified in Eq. (A4), use the quadratic
cost function c(r)= (h/2)(r)2 and the marginal
conditions Eq. (1) and Eq. (A2) to obtain

apf
a(pf + p dc )
and r t =
(A5)
h
2h
Substitute r p and r t into Eq. (A4) to obtain

rp=

6 tf(r t)− c(r p)− 6 0f (r p)
=

(pf + p dc )2a 2 (pf + p uc )2a 2 pf(pf + p dc )2a 2
−
−
4h
2h
8h

p 2f a 2 a 2
= [ −p 2f + pf(2p dc − 4p uc )+ (p dc )2]
(A6)
4h
8h
Let H(pf)= − p 2f + pf(2p dc − 4p uc )+ (p dc )2 and note
that

+

sign[6 tf(r t)− c(r p)− 6 0f (r p)]= signH(pf)
2
f

d
c

u
c

(A7)

d 2
c

H(pf)= − p + pf(2p − 4p )+ (p ) has the following characteristics:
1. H%(pf)= − 2pf + (2p dc − 4p uc )B 0 (recall that
p uc \ p dc );
2. H(0)= (p dc )2 \ 0;
3. H(pf = p dc )= p dc (2p dc − 4p uc )B 0
Since the relevant domain of H(pf) is the closed
interval [0, p dc ], these characteristics state that
H(pf) is monotonically decreasing in pf, its vertical
intercept is positive and when pf = p dc , H(pf) is
negative. These characteristics imply that there
exists p̄f such that H(p̄f)= 0; in fact, p̄f is the
positive root of H(pf)= − p 2f + pf(2p dc − 4p uc )+
(p dc )2. Most significantly, the sign of H(pf) is the
same as the sign of (p̄f − pf), and hence, the sign of
Eq. (A6) is the same as the sign of (p̄f − pf). We
conclude that the forester will build a road of
length r t prior to bargaining if and only if the
per-acre timber value of the forest is less than p̄f.
Proof of Corollary 1. From the proof of Lemma 3,
p̄f is the positive root of H(pf)= − p 2f + pf(2p dc −
4p uc )+ (p dc )2 = 0, and therefore, we can write p̄f as
a function of p uc and p dc ; that is= pf(p uc ,p dc ). Note
that H(p̄f)= − (p̄f)2 + p̄f(2p dc − 4p uc )+ (p dc )2 0.
Differentiate H(p̄f) with respect to p uc and rearrange the result to obtain (p̄f/(p uc = 4p̄f/(2p dc −
4p uc − 2p̄f)B 0, the sign of which follows because
p uc \ p dc . Now, differentiate H(p̄f) with respect to
p dc and rearrange the result to obtain (p̄f/(p uc = −
2(p̄f + p dc )/(2p dc − 4p uc − 2p̄f)\ 0. Again, the sign of
(p̄f/(p uc follows because p uc \ p dc .
Proof of Corollaries 2 and 3. When p dc = 0,
H(pf)= − p 2f − 4pfp uc B 0, and H%(pf)= − 2pf −

4p uc B0. Therefore, when p dc =0, the forester will
never prepare a portion of the forest for harvest
prior to negotiations. On the other hand, when
p dc = p uc , H(pf) has exactly the same characteristics
as when p dc (0,p uc ). Therefore, when p dc =p uc , the
existence of p̄f (0,p uc ) is guaranteed.
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